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ALL FAMILIES ARE EQUAL, BUT DO SOME 
MATTER MORE THAN OTHERS? HOW 
GENDER, POVERTY, AND DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE PUT QUEBEC’S FAMILY LAW 




Who needs family law? While it is tempting to answer 
“everyone”, the stakes are not the same for all. I propose 
to evaluate family law rules in terms of how they address 
high-stakes situations—that is, the condition of vulnerable 
women. Thus, the test of good family law should be how 
well it deals with poverty and domestic violence, factors 
that directly constrain women’s ability to negotiate fair 
outcomes.  
 
To explore this method, I take the example of a 
recent proposal, developed by Alain Roy’s reform 
committee (the “Comité consultatif sur le droit de la 
famille”), and regarding which the Quebec government 
held public consultations in 2019. I show that this reform 
proposal, which purports to respond to the diversity of 
Quebec families, rather prioritizes a single ideal of the 
modern, equal, and autonomous family. The reform’s 
supposedly autonomy-enhancing rules would especially 
penalize poor and victimized women—thus failing my 
proposed test of good family law. These women, I argue, 
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INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLE OF FAMILY 
LAW 
 
Denise, of thirty-two years, is a white, middle-class dentist. 
Irma is a racialized immigrant housekeeper who does not 
know French or English. Victoria is unemployed and the 
victim of conjugal violence. Odile is a sixty-seven-year-old 
widow.1 
 
These are but a fraction of the life circumstances 
that family law must tackle. Diversity in age, gender, 
sexual orientation, race, class, ability, legal knowledge, and 
many more areas makes designing family laws suitable for 
all a monumental challenge. Can the law be equally 
responsive to all personal circumstances and family 
relationships, and, if not, whose interests should come 
first? 
 
One response to this puzzle is minimalistic 
regulation, where individuals are free to adjust the fit. 
Another option is to regulate for paradigmatic cases and 
hope that residual freedom and discretion will 
accommodate other needs. Before endorsing one approach 
over the other, let us ponder: who, among our four 
characters, needs family law the most? Who needs it the 
least?  
 
Here, I propose that family law should focus on 
difficult cases—in particular, women with little legal 
 
*  DPhil candidate in Law at Oxford University. The author thanks the 
anonymous reviewers for their precious feedback. 
1  Tips for recalling the names of our characters: Denise: dentist; Irma: 
immigrant; Victoria: victim; Odile: old.  
     ALL FAMILIES ARE EQUAL, BUT DO SOME MATTER    427
MORE THAN OTHERS? 
knowledge or economic power, and women in violent 
relationships—rather than building schemes around an 
ideal of the equal and independent couple. Poverty and 
domestic violence raise the stakes of family regulation and 
exacerbate the need for good law. We must, then, legislate 
for Victoria, not for Denise.  
 
To illustrate this argument and put it to the test, I 
critique, with the help of our protagonists, a proposal for 
the reform of Quebec family law. The project, presented in 
the recommendations of Alain Roy’s reform committee 
and in a public consultation held by the Quebec 
government in 2019, would slash important family law 
protections.2 It proposes abolishing the mandatory sharing 
of family patrimony, changing the default matrimonial 
regime from the sharing of acquests to the sharing of only 
family patrimony, and introducing a scheme for regulating 
cohabiting parents based on the compensation of some 
relationship-generated disadvantages.  
 
This public consultation attracted strong 
opposition.3 While purporting to respond to the diversity of 
relationships in modern society, the reform speaks to an 
 
2  See Québec, Ministère de la Justice, Public Consultation on Family 
Law Reform, by Sonia LeBel (Québec: Gouvernement du Québec, 
2019), online (pdf): 
<www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/contenu/documents/
En__Anglais_/centredoc/publications/ministere/dossiers/consultation/
document_consultation-a.pdf> [Ministère de la Justice, “Family Law 
Reform”]. 
3  See “Submitted briefs”, online: Ministère de la justice 
<www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/en/department/issues/family/submitted-
briefs>. These are the briefs sent in response to the public 
consultation. 
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archetypical autonomous, egalitarian family. This overly 
optimistic appraisal of family life in modern Quebec 
society could have dramatic consequences for families who 
deviate from this ideal and who are the most vulnerable.  
 
In this article, I first expose the proposed reform 
and its assumptions of formal equality and individualistic 
autonomy. I then develop what I suggest should be the test 
of good family law: how well it deals with the situation of 
women who have little economic power or who are in 
violent relationships. I apply this test to the reform proposal 
and call on our four protagonists to help us see how the 
changes would penalize women, especially those who 
cannot exercise a fantasized autonomy due to poverty or 
intimate partner violence. Finally, I expose three fatal flaws 
in how the reform proposal deals with autonomy, the 
public/private interaction, and inequality, before pointing 
to fairer alternatives.  
 
My conclusions have implications beyond 
Quebec’s latest reform proposal: regulating stubbornly 
unequal yet rapidly changing family relationships in a fair 
manner is a challenge that still confounds jurisdictions 
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THE CONTEXT: WHERE WE MEET A 
PROPOSED REFORM SERVING AUTONOMY, 
FORMAL EQUALITY, AND THE IDEAL LEGAL 
SUBJECT 
 
My analysis is based on a reform proposal put together by 
the Comité consultatif sur le droit de la famille (the “Roy 
Committee”).4 In June 2019, the Quebec government held 
public consultations on some of the Roy Committee’s 
recommendations. At the time of writing this article, no bill 
has been made public. Hence, we do not know what the 
expected reform will ultimately look like. Nevertheless, the 
Roy Committee’s report (the “Roy Report”) is a great 
starting point to present my argument on the test of good 
family law, the importance of domestic violence, and the 
meaning of autonomy. Moreover, the Roy Report will 
likely continue to constitute a tempting starting point for 
family law reforms in the years to come. Hence, my 
arguments will remain relevant regardless of the fate of this 
particular reform project. Before getting into these 
arguments, some context is called for.  
 
 
4  Comité consultatif sur le droit de la famille (sous la présidence de 
Alain Roy), Pour un droit de la famille adapté aux nouvelles réalités 
conjugales et familiales (Québec: Ministère de la Justice du Québec, 
2015), online (pdf): 
<www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/contenu/documents/
Fr__francais_/centredoc/rapports/couple-
famille/droit_fam7juin2015.pdf> [The Roy Report]. 
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THE CONTEXT FOR THE ROY REPORT 
 
Family law reform is long-awaited, as “[t]he last major 
reform of family law took place in 1980.”5 A 2013 
Supreme Court decision intensified the need for reform: the 
Court had to decide whether the differential treatment of 
married and unmarried couples in Quebec was 
unconstitutional.6 Supreme Court Justice Abella’s camp 
found unjustified discrimination of unmarried couples,7 
while Supreme Court Justice LeBel’s camp saw no 
infringement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.8 Chief Justice McLachlin’s deciding vote that 
the Quebec regime constituted a justified infringement of 
the right to equality sealed the fate of the case.9  
 
This decision left Quebec as the only Canadian 
province not to recognize any default obligation between 
unmarried partners. The government tasked a committee 
(the Comité consultatif sur le droit de la famille), led by 
notary Alain Roy, with reviewing the entirety of family 
law. Although more modest in scope, the government’s 
proposed reform can be traced back to identical proposals 
in the Roy Committee’s report, submitted in June 2015.10 
Given this context, it is surprising that the proposed 
 
5   See Ministère de la Justice, “Family Law Reform”, supra note 2 at 5. 
6  See Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5. 
7  See ibid at para 377 (Deschamps, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ 
found that only the exclusion from support was not justified: para 
382). 
8  See ibid at para 282. 
9  See ibid at para 449.  
10  See The Roy Report, supra note 4. 
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changes do so little for de facto couples and rearrange so 
much of a matrimonial regime that was not generating 
commotion.  
 
Indeed, the reform proposes ending the mandatory 
sharing of family patrimony, changing the default 
matrimonial regime from a partnership of acquests to 
family patrimony,11 and establishing minimal imperative 
protections for parents, married or not.12 Under the new 
imperative parental regime, all couples with children 
would have to contribute to the expenses of the family, the 
family residence would be protected, and economic redress 
would be possible through a compensatory allowance.13  
 
THE PROPOSED REFORM’S THEORETICAL 
UNDERPINNINGS  
 
The proposed reform is based on neo-liberal assumptions. 
For instance, it echoes the Roy Committee’s faith in 
contractualization and personal autonomy as central values 
in family law.14 These principles fall squarely within a 
formal equality approach: “family law must reflect the 
formal equality of the spouses, whether married or not, by 
leaving them free to arrange the legal aspects of their 
relationship.”15 The couple is imagined as “a space of 
 
11  See Ministère de la Justice, “Family Law Reform”, supra note 2 at 
19. 
12  See ibid at 8. 
13  See ibid at 9–10. 
14  See ibid at 14. 
15  Ibid at 7. 
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autonomy of will and freedom of contract.”16 Whether the 
couple is indeed a space of autonomy is, of course, 
debatable. Victoria might disagree.  
 
Further, the reform project is centred on a specific 
model of family life: independent partners and 
interdependent parents. The Committee views “[s]hared 
responsibility for a child as the main source of 
interdependence”:17  
The fact that two spouses live together in a 
marriage or de facto union does not 
necessarily mean that they are 
interdependent; this is not the case, for 
example, for two people who form a couple 
at the age of [sixty-five] or two young adults 
who both have a career and are financially 
independent. However, the birth of a child 
will generally create a situation of 
interdependence for the parents.18 
Here we can recognize Odile and Denise. Odile is 
past the age of childbearing. Denise represents the young 
professional who is too modern to carry in their 
relationship the passé marks of inequality. The Committee 
 
16  Québec, Ministère de la Justice, Consultation publique sur la réforme 




document_consultation.pdf> [Author translation].   
17  Ministère de la Justice, “Family Law Reform”, supra note 2 at 7. 
18  See ibid at 8. 
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rejects a default regime based on needs or income sharing, 
preferring a clean-break compensatory regime that treats 
inequality within the couple as an exception to the norm.  
 
By leaving tremendous space for couples to create 
their own rules, the reform presumes informed and 
proactive legal subjects with the financial means, cognitive 
capacity, and time to make these decisions. The 
minimalistic regime reflects the idea that the couple knows 
what is best and can achieve fairness even if the weaker 
party is less protected. After all, there is no weaker party in 
a modern couple.  
 
The reform strives for “[a]n inclusive response 
adapted to the diversity of couples and families.”19 We 
might think of “inclusive” as protecting even the most 
vulnerable, but here “inclusive[ness]” stands for 
recognizing new and modern forms of family (for example, 
young professionals, same-gender couples) who 
presumably do not need protection. The reform committee 
writes: 
Family law must not be used to legitimize one 
model for couples or families to the detriment 
of others. Instead, it must adapt to the 
diversity of and differences between families 
that are characteristic of Québec society.20 
However, because the rules are centred on the 
autonomous, equal, and independent legal subject—an 
idealized model—the Committee does the opposite of 
 
19  Ibid at 7. 
20  Ibid. 
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recognizing a diversity of families and needs. It abandons 
those who cannot pay the price of contractual freedom: 
people without legal knowledge or financial means (like 
Irma), and people within unequal relationships who cannot 
negotiate on equal footing (like Victoria).  
 
Finally, the Committee anticipates “[c]itizens 
aware of their rights and obligations” who can make 
enlightened decisions in “[a]n accessible family justice 
system”21—another excess of optimism which clashes with 
reality.22 
 
All in all, the reform presents a rosy narrative of the 
free and autonomous legal subject. A logic of atomistic 
liberalism augurs badly for ordinary women living under 
conditions of patriarchy. While “[p]rivate ordering is not 
per se a bad thing, provided it is done fairly,” the reform 
fails to ensure these conditions of fairness and “sacrifices 






21  Ibid. 
22  See Hélène Belleau, Quand l’amour et l’État rendent aveugle: le 
mythe du mariage automatique (Québec: PUQ, 2012) [Belleau, le 
mythe du mariage automatique] on how and why unmarried partners 
are unaware of their rights and obligations. 
23  Martha Shaffer, “Domestic Contracts, Part II: The Supreme Court’s 
Decision in Hartshorne v. Hartshorne” (2004) 20:2 Can J Fam L 261 
at 289 (discussing Hartshorne v Hartshorne, 2004 SCC 22). 
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THE METHOD: TESTING FAMILY LAW BY 
FOCUSING ON GENDER, POVERTY, AND 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
 
How should we evaluate a reform proposal to decide if it is 
good law? I suggest that rules should be put to the test of 
gender, violence, and poverty. That is, a law that ignores 
poor women suffering domestic violence cannot be good 
law, while a law centred on their needs is more likely to 
work for everyone. Thus, thinking about law requires 
particularization, rather than abstract and gender-blind 
concepts of legal subjects and families.  
 
WHY GENDER MATTERS: AVOIDING SEXIST 
BIASES IN FAMILY LAW 
 
Laws that are insensitive to gender generate biases against 
women.24 Law reform is an already complicated and 
unpredictable process: it should not, on top of that, be 
grounded on a myth, such as the existence of gender 
equality. Thus, feminist scholars have called for family law 
to be thought of from the perspective of women, consistent 
with the legislative method of gender-based analysis that 
“[s]eek[s] to ensure that before policy decisions are taken, 
 
24  See e.g. Susan B Boyd, Child Custody, Law, and Women’s Work 
(Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2003) on gender biases in 
family law. See also Suzanne Zaccour, “Crazy Women and Hysterical 
Mothers: The Gendered Use of Mental-Health Labels in Custody 
Disputes” (2018) 31:1 Can J Fam L 57; Suzanne Zaccour, “Parental 
Alienation in Quebec Custody Litigation” (2018) 59:4 C de D 1073.  
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an analysis of their impact on women and men, 
respectively, is carried out.”25  
 
Gender-sensitivity is called for not because women 
and men are essentially different, but because their realities 
are distinct. John Langston Gwaltney wrote in 1980 that 
“[t]he mind of the man and the mind of the woman is the 
same . . . but this business of living makes women use their 
minds in ways that men don’t even have to think about.”26 
Women are more likely to suffer intimate partner violence, 
earn less than their male partner, and undertake more 
unpaid domestic work. In Quebec, sixty percent of 
minimum-wage workers are women, and women earn 
$2.55 less per hour than men.27 Women who work full-time 
like their partners do sixty-two percent of domestic work; 
working women whose partner does not work still do forty-
nine percent of that work.28 Susan Boyd also calls attention 
to the fact that “the oft-mentioned ‘child poverty’ is 
 
25  World Conference on Women, “Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action” The IV World Conference on Women, 1995, 16th Plen Mtg 
at 86, online (pdf): United Nations 
<www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/Beijing_Declaration_and_Pl
atform_for_Action.pdf >. 
26  John Langston Gwaltney, Drylongso: A Self-Portrait of Black 
America (New York: Random House, 1980) at 33. 
27  See Observatoire de la pauvreté et des inégalités au Québec, 
“Femmes et pauvreté” (12 October 2015) at 1, online (pdf): Collectif 
pour un Québec sans pauvreté, <pauvrete.qc.ca/IMG/pdf/151015-
femmespauvretemontage.pdf>. 
28  Ibid.  
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inextricably linked to women’s poverty.”29 Indeed, one in 
three woman-led single-parent families are poor, compared 
to one in seven man-led single-parent families.30 
 
A law that does not recognize gender differences 
cannot remedy, and indeed risks aggravating, these 
inequalities. As put by Kimberlé Crenshaw, the mother of 
intersectionality, “[i]t is fairly obvious that treating 
different things the same can generate as much an 
inequality as treating the same things differently.”31 As 
such, feminist family law scholars have exposed “[t]the 
pitfalls of a formal equality approach in family law . . . on 
both theoretical and empirical levels.”32 Boyd concludes 
that “gender-neutral legal norms . . . sit uncomfortably next 







29  Susan B Boyd, “Can Law Challenge the Public/Private Divide? 
Women, Work, and Family” (1996) 15 Windsor YB Access Just 161 
at 173. 
30  See Observatoire de la pauvreté et des inégalités au Québec, supra 
note 27 at 2.  
31  Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, “Color blindness, history, and the law” 
in Wahneema Lubiano, ed, The House That Race Built (New York: 
Pantheon, 1997) 280 at 285. 
32  Susan B Boyd, “Equality: An Uncomfortable Fit in Parenting Law” in 
Robert Leckey, ed, After Legal Equality: Family, Sex, Kinship (New 
York: Routledge, 2015) 42 at 43. 
33  Ibid at 42. 
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THE CHALLENGE OF MARGINALIZATION AND 
INTERSECTIONALITY  
 
The necessity of gender-sensitive analyses is nothing new, 
and indeed the current challenge for feminists is rather to 
engage in truly intersectional thinking that does not 
subordinate other identities (particularly race) to gender. 
Centring family law exclusively around privileged white 
women fails to challenge interlocking power structures. 
Intersectional legal scholars thus propose evaluating the 
law in terms of the situation of marginalized women. For 
example, black feminism advocates centring racialized 
women in the fight against patriarchy and white supremacy 
in order to free all women. As Patricia Hill Collins explains 
in her book Black Feminist Thought, centring black women 
does not mean decentring others or engaging in a merely 
comparative exercise.34 It means going to the root of the 
oppression of women and black people, recognizing the 
dual allegiances of black women to both their race and their 
gender, and understanding the deep interdependence 
between the structures of patriarchy and other forms of 
power relations.35 
 
These teachings are relevant to my project of 
testing and criticizing autonomy-centric reform proposals. 
 
34  See Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, 
Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment (New York: 
Routledge, 2000) at vii–viii, 124–25.  
35  See ibid. See also Chris Weedon, 2nd ed, Feminist Practice and 
Poststructuralist Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); Kimberle 
Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist 
Theory and Antiracist Politics” (1989) U Chicago Legal F 139. 
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Indeed, one of the consequences of centring reflections 
about the family around white, middle-class women is the 
assumption that women and children enjoy the economic 
security and the racial privilege that enable them “to see 
themselves primarily as individuals in search of personal 
autonomy, instead of members of racial ethnic groups 
struggling for power.”36 Such assumptions fall prey to the 
“decontextualization of Western social thought overall.”37 
Thus, the feminist project of centring the margins is 
intrinsically linked to the feminist project of challenging 
neo-liberal conceptions of autonomy.  
 
WHY POVERTY MATTERS: RAISING THE 
STAKES IN FAMILY DISPUTES  
 
Among the circumstances represented in my characters’ 
stories, I want to draw attention to poverty and domestic 
violence because of how directly they affect a person’s 
autonomy to utilize the law for their benefit, safety, and 
well-being.  
 
As we know, the law is inaccessible to most 
citizens. In 2012, the Canadian Department of Justice 
estimated that “between [forty percent] and [fifty-seven 
percent] of parties are self-represented when they appear in 
 
36  Patricia Hill Collins, “Shifting the Center: Race, Class, and Feminist 
Theorizing about Motherhood” in Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Grace 
Chang & Linda Rennie Forcey, eds, Mothering Ideology, Experience, 
and Agency (New York: Routledge, 1994) 45 at 48. 
37  Ibid at 45. 
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court for family law issues.”38 This proportion is on the 
rise,39 and most self-represented litigants cite lack of means 
as their reason for self-representing.40  
 
Poverty also means comparatively higher 
transaction and outcome costs for litigants. For rich 
couples, the difference between one matrimonial regime 
and another is significant in amount, hence the practice of 
signing prenuptial agreements in higher social classes. 
Relative to their finances, however, affluent people do not 
face high risks. For someone in a situation of precarity, 
alimony or protection of family patrimony can 
dramatically impact their standard of life, their health, and 
their ability to care for their children. Money has 
diminishing returns, as empirical studies in positive 
psychology and behavioural economics have 
demonstrated.41 Should family law not primarily concern 
itself with people whose well-being and survival, rather 
than third car, is at stake? 
 
For the state, the stakes in family disputes are also 
higher with regard to underprivileged legal subjects. 
Different legal rules can decide between private and state 
support. A more protective regime frees state resources by 
ensuring that indigent litigants receive basic assistance. 
 
38  Canada, Department of Justice, JustFacts: Self-Represented Litigants 
in Family Law (Ottawa: DOJ, June 2016), online: 
<www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/divorce/jf-pf/srl-pnr.html>. 
39  See ibid. 
40  See ibid. 
41  See e.g. Daniel Kahneman & Angus Deaton, “High Income Improves 
Evaluation of Life But Not Emotional Well-Being” (2010) 107:38 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 16489. 
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While private solutions to poverty are disputable,42 they 
may be the only solution in the context of right-leaning 
governments.  
 
The access to justice discourse connects poverty to 
the challenges of law-making at the procedural level: we 
need accessible courts, legal education, legal aid, etcetera. 
My article draws attention to the ways in which centring 
preoccupations about poverty informs substantive law, and 
especially the choice of default protective rules. 
  
WHY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MATTERS: 
SAFETY OVER AUTONOMY  
 
I want to add conjugal violence to the intersectional mantra 
of gender, race, class, and sexuality.43 Granted, domestic 
violence is not a permanent identity along an axis of 
oppression. Yet I argue that it is an important category that 
must be recognized and centred in feminist thought and not 
merely seen as a circumstance among others that happens 
to certain women. Domestic violence is central to family 
law. With my proposed test of family law, I am calling for 
scholars to treat domestic violence not as an exception, but 
rather as a paradigmatic case.  
 
 
42  See e.g. Brenda Cossman, “Family Feuds: Neo-Liberal and Neo-
Conservative Visions of the Reprivatization Project” in Brenda 
Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds, Privatization, Law, and the Challenge 
to Feminism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 169; Susan 
B Boyd, “Family, Law and Sexuality: Feminist Engagements” (1999) 
8:3 Soc & Leg Stud 369 at 380. 
43  I voluntarily omit ability and species from this list as they are far 
from systematically integrated to even intersectional analyses. 
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First and foremost, we need to end the process of 
denial that allows most of society to see domestic violence 
as rare. Countless studies across the world have 
documented its ubiquity.44 Hence, intimate partner 
violence cannot be treated as an exception, even less so 
among litigating families45 where an even higher 
proportion of women has been victimized by their 
partner.46  
 
Another reason to give conjugal violence more 
attention is that in situations of violence, getting the law 
right is of paramount importance—possibly a matter of life 
or death. When the law communicates to victims of 
domestic violence that a separation would have disastrous 
consequences, they are dissuaded from leaving. Thus, a 
law that does not help separating women achieve fair and 
safe outcomes is complicit in their entrapment. 
 
Moreover, in direct opposition to the reform’s 
atomistic liberalism, agreements negotiated within 
coercive relationships are unlikely to be any more 
autonomy-enhancing than state-imposed solutions.47 This 
is important because the ability to contract out of default 
 
44  See e.g. Eline Leen et al, “Prevalence, Dynamic Risk Factors and the 
Efficacy of Primary Interventions for Adolescent Dating Violence: 
An International Review” (2013) 18:1 Aggression & Violent 
Behavior 159. 
45  See e.g. Douglas A Brownridge, “Violence Against Women Post-
Separation” (2006) 11:5 Aggression & Violent Behavior 514. 
46  See e.g. Boyd, supra note 32 at 44. 
47  See Demie Kurz, “Separation, Divorce, and Woman Abuse” (1996) 
2:1 Violence Against Women 63. The article provides insight into 
how domestic violence impacts divorce negotiations.  
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rules is cherished precisely based on the assumption that 
freedom of choice enables people to enhance their well-
being. However, this assumption does not hold for women 
in violent relationships, as they are not negotiating from a 
position of equality. Men in coercive relationships can use 
the children as bargaining chips to force women to agree to 
unfavourable deals. They can assert control and dominance 
through physical, psychological, economic, or sexual 
violence. In an era of formal equality where shared custody 
is normative,48 women are made increasingly vulnerable to 
unequal results, as their efforts to protect themselves and 
their children from dangerous custody outcomes further 
disrupts their ability to negotiate fair economic outcomes.49 
 
FOCUSING THE LAW ON THE NEEDS OF THOSE 
WHO NEED IT  
 
The proposals I make throughout this article depart from 
Quebec family law’s 150-year-old grounding in 
voluntarism and liberal individualism reaffirmed in the 
recent Quebec v A50 decision and the 600-page Roy 
 
48  See Denyse Côté & Florina Gaborean, “Nouvelles normativités de la 
famille: la garde partagée au Québec, en France et en Belgique” 
(2015) 27:1 CJWL 22 at 24. 
49  See Dale Bagshaw et al, “The Effect of Family Violence on Post-
Separation Parenting Arrangements: The Experiences and Views of 
Children and Adults from Families Who Separated Post-1995 and 
Post-2006” (2011) 86 Family Matters 49 at 59; Miranda Kaye, Julie 
Stubbs & Julia Tolmie, “Domestic Violence, Separation and 
Parenting: Negotiating Safety Using Legal Processes” (2003) 15:2 
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 73 at 73. 
50  Quebec (Attorney General) v A, supra note 6. 
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Report.51 This change of paradigm is called for by a 
reflection on family law reform that centres women’s 
realities. At the intersection of poverty and violence, we 
find women unable to afford equal and autonomous 
bargaining. Affirming the importance of autonomy and 
formal equality does not change this reality.  
 
Thinking through the law from the perspective of 
someone who cannot afford optimal, informed, and free 
legal choices is not centring the margins, but being 
realistic. It is the rich, white, autonomous, free-from-
violence woman who is the exception—not Irma or 
Victoria. Centring real rather than idealized family 
circumstances is also pragmatic. Because people and 
families have varied needs and vulnerabilities, family law 
needs to be centred around those who need it the most. It is 
only logical to centre family law, by default, around the 
position of groups of people who are unable to opt out, for 
whom the stakes are higher, or who represent an important 
fraction of legal subjects. Centring poverty and domestic 
violence means paying attention to the needs of particular 
groups to make for better law for everyone. The proposed 
reform does the opposite. 
 
What about women who have the means to tailor 
the law to their needs and who are in equal relationships—
would it be unfair and perhaps paternalistic to impose on 
them presumptions that they are vulnerable and in need of 
protection? It is safer to err on the side of treating modern 
couples as burdened by traditional unequal roles than to 
treat unequal partners as independent and autonomous. 
Indeed, modern, equal, financially comfortable couples are 
 
51  See The Roy Report, supra note 4. 
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more able to make authentic legal choices and to 
effectively derogate from default rules. Denise’s couple 
has access to legal services and can negotiate on a near-
equal footing. She needs good defaults the least because, 
contrary to Irma and Victoria, she can create a law of her 
own. Certainly, her independence is not absolute and, even 
for privileged people, atomistic autonomy remains more 
myth than reality. Yet in contrast with other characters, she 
can adapt the law to her circumstances. Why, then, would 
we design our default rules for her condition? 
 
Based on this reasoning, we need a regime that 
Denise can tailor to her lucky situation and that respects 
Odile’s couple’s lesser degree of interdependence, but we 
also need a law that protects Irma by default against 
inaction, and we especially need a law that protects 
Victoria by default and against her own consent. In other 
words, we need a law that is protective by default, allowing 
some opting out while maintaining a core of inalienable 
entitlements to protect people in unequal relationships.  
 
 With the proposed reform’s excessive emphasis on 
autonomy, Quebec deviates from this goal. Legislating for 
Denise and Odile puts Irma and Victoria at risk. The 
proposed reform fails the test of good family law.  
 
THE TEST: WHERE WE EVALUATE THE 
REFORM PROPOSAL FROM THE PERSPECTIVE 
OF MARGINALIZED WOMEN 
 
In this section, I apply my proposed test of family law to 
three important changes proposed by the reform and the 
Roy Report: the end of the mandatory sharing of family 
patrimony, the change of the default matrimonial regime, 
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and the limited protection of de facto partners. I use our 
four characters to connect the anticipated consequences of 
these changes to fictional but realistic women’s stories.  
 
CHANGES FOR MARRIED COUPLES 
 
The Context of Quebec’s Matrimonial Regime and 
Family Patrimony 
 
If it is not broken, fix it anyways is a reasonable appraisal 
of the proposed changes examined in their historical 
context. Until 1970, the matrimonial regime in Quebec was 
one of community of property. The regime was unpopular, 
with seventy percent of couples opting out to choose a full 
separation of property.52 This choice was highly 
detrimental for women and left many of them entirely 
destitute upon separation.53 The situation was so critical 
that the legislator had to intervene. In 1970, the legislator 
changed the default matrimonial regime to the sharing of 
acquests54 and, in 1989, it imposed the equal sharing of 
family patrimony for married couples, with limited 
exceptions.55 These changes dramatically reduced the use 
 
52  See Danielle Burman, “Politiques législatives québécoises dans 
l’aménagement des rapports pécuniaires entre époux: d’une justice 
bien pensée a un semblant de justice – un juste sujet de s’alarmer” 
(1988) 22:2 RJT 149 at 155. 
53  See Miriam Grassby, “Nouveau regard sur les contrats de mariage au 
Québec à la lumière de l’arrêt Hartshorne” (2008) 292 
Développements récents en droit familial, 45 at 63–4. 
54   Loi concernant les régimes matrimoniaux, LQ 1969, c 77. 
55  Loi modifiant le Code civil du Québec et d’autres dispositions 
législatives afin de favoriser l’égalité économique des époux, LQ 
1989, c 55.  
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of marital agreements. In 2005, only ten percent of couples 
signed a marriage contract.56 The briefs and parliamentary 
debates on the family patrimony rules show a 
preoccupation regarding the consequences of a 
“contractual freedom” that is not gender neutral. As one 
brief puts it: “without purporting to be sexist, we however 
must realize that most of the time, in the choice of a 
matrimonial regime, it is the man who sets the tone.”57 The 
freedom to contractually opt for a full separation of 
property has been experimented with in Quebec, and 
deemed a failure, while the separation of acquests has 
proved an adequate regime for most couples.  
 
The concerns that led to the 1989 reform, meant “to 
mitigate the injustices produced by the implementation of 
a freely adopted matrimonial regime,”58 were known to 
the Roy Committee. In his dissent, Dominique Goubau 
argues that “we can label as a myth, especially in the 
conjugal context, the belief that what has been negotiated 
and mutually consented is necessarily fair.”59 He concludes 
that “it is with circumspection that contractual freedom 
 
56  See Alain Roy, “Le contrat de mariage en droit québécois: un destin 
marqué du sceau du paradoxe” (2005) 51:4 McGill LJ 665 at 667. 
57  Christine Morin, “La contractualisation du mariage : réflexions sur les 
fonctions du Code civil du Québec dans la famille” (2008) 49:4 C de 
D 527 at 540 [translated by author], citing Tribune unique et populaire 
d’information juridique, Mémoire du partage à l’intention de la 
commission parlementaire sur le partage des biens entre les époux 
(Québec: TUPIJ, 1988) at 2.  
58  Lacroix v Valois, [1990] 2 RCS 1259 at 1276, 74 DLR (4th) 61 
[emphasis added]. 
59  The Roy Report, supra note 4 at 584 [Dominique Goubau’s dissent, 
author translation]. 
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must be given space in the domain of family and conjugal 
relations.”60 
 
The Proposed Reform for Married Couples 
 
Abolishing the mandatory sharing of family patrimony and 
rejecting the default sharing of acquests would turn back 
the clock for women and heighten poor and victimized 
women’s vulnerability.61 Protections that cannot be opted 
out of would be limited to federal alimony rules (the 
committee deplores that it cannot abolish them due to 
constitutional constraints) as well as a new mandatory 
parental regime that would only apply to parents and 
include the possibility of a compensatory allowance. 
Granted, the economic position of women in society has 
changed since the 1970s. However, women still own less, 
still earn less, and are still victimized by their partners to a 
high degree. Because we have not yet reached a state of 
equality between women and men, the proposed changes 
would primarily penalize women and benefit men.  
 
The proposal also invents autonomy problems 
where none exist. Couples who want to escape the equal 
sharing of family patrimony can already renounce it at the 
end of the relationship. Real autonomy is not curtailed, but 
rather sheltered from couples’ optimism bias and inability 
 
60  Ibid [author translation]. 
61  I deliberately use victimized and not abused to avoid euphemizing 
and normalizing connotations. See Michaël Lessard & Suzanne 
Zaccour, “Quel genre de droit? Autopsie du sexisme dans la langue 
juridique” (2017) 47:2/3 RDUS 227. 
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to predict the future.62 Moreover, the law already permits 
unequal sharing in certain circumstances to avoid 
injustices.63 Instead of tweaking the conditions for this 
exception, the proposal needlessly opts for the more 
extreme avenue. 
 
In cases of so-called traditional marriages, 
compensation regimes leave surpluses with the employed 
partner rather than equalizing the position of breadwinner 
and homemaker as sharing regimes do. If the Committee 
wanted to soften sharing rules, less drastic avenues could 
have been pursued, such as changing presumptions of 
equal and unequal sharing of family patrimony. Allowing 
a full opting out of family patrimony protections increases 
the economic power of men over their (generally) poorer 
partner. No adequate mechanisms to ensure that such 
opting out does not result from or create opportunities for 
coercive control are proposed.  
 
Abandoning partnership of acquests as the default 
regime is also misguided, given its popularity. Shifting the 
default regime when the current one has a low rate of 
opting out creates an undue burden on financially 
precarious couples. Indeed, contracting out of a default 
regime is expensive. The costs are not only financial but 
also emotional, as marital contracts may create a “‘me 
 
62  See e.g. Belleau, supra note 22; Hélène Belleau, “D’un mythe à 
l’autre : de l’ignorance des lois à la présomption du choix éclairé chez 
les conjoints en union libre” (2015) 27:1 CJWL 1. 
63  See Art 422 CCQ. 
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versus you’ mentality” and have negative signalling64 to 
which violent men can react particularly badly.  
 
Sharing acquests is also valuable socially because 
it attenuates economic inequalities between breadwinner 
and homemaker as well as between unequally remunerated 
women and men. This regime has been adopted in 
numerous civil law jurisdictions, including France, Poland, 
and Spain, and is considered more appropriate to modern 
life than a full community of property.65 It sometimes 
includes residual discretion for judges to order an unequal 
sharing of acquests in exceptional circumstances. While 
the sharing of acquests is not appropriate for all couples, 
those who wish to maintain a higher degree of financial 
independence should bear the burden of opting out of the 
protective regime, rather than the other way around. As I 
have argued, protective defaults make better law than non-
protective defaults because of the relative ease of opting 
out experienced by those who do not need protection 
compared to those who do.  
 
The change proposed by the Roy Committee cannot 
be brushed aside as an inconsequential decision that leaves 
couples with the freedom to reproduce the previous regime. 
 
64  See Helen Reece, “Leaping Without Looking” in Robert Leckey, ed, 
After Legal Equality: Family, Sex, Kinship (Abingdon, UK: 
Routledge, 2015) 115 at 120. 
65  See e.g. Joanna Miles & Jens M Scherpe, “The Legal Consequences 
of Dissolution: Property and Financial Support Between Spouses” in 
John Eekelaar & Rob George, eds, Routledge Handbook of Family 
Law and Policy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014) 138; Jens M Scherpe, 
“The Financial Consequences of Divorce in a European Perspective” 
in Jens M Scherpe, ed, European Family Law Vol III – Family Law in 
a European Perspective (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2016) 146. 
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Defaults are too sticky, not only for the reasons we have 
seen but also due to optimism bias. Couples consistently 
underestimate the likelihood of separation. Couples’ 
inaction is not entirely irrational, as optimism satisfies 
marital expectations, turning into a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.66 In that context, could not having to choose be 
more valuable than the freedom to choose?67   
 
Voices of Four Married Women 
 
In a society in which women continue to earn less than their 
male partners and to provide more domestic and emotional 
labour, it is not hard to see that it is women who will pay 
the price of the new regime’s purported “modernity.” But 
women are not all similarly situated, as we can explore 
through the fictional testimonies of our four characters. 
 
Denise:  
My partner and I discussed signing a marital 
agreement, but our notary told us that with 
the default regime we would remain 
financially independent regarding our 
income and share our family home and car. 
This matched what we both wanted, so we 
didn’t bother with making a contract.  
Ten years later, we are about to divorce. We 
have two young children. Even though we 
 
66  See Sandra L Murray & John G Holmes, “A Leap of Faith? Positive 
Illusions in Romantic Relationships” (1997) 23:6 Personality & 
Social Psychology Bulletin 586 at 598. 
67  See e.g. Reece, supra note 64 at 121. 
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decided to share the parental work, I have had 
to take a maternity leave and work part-time. 
My ex now earns thirty percent more than I 
do. I am told by my lawyer that I may receive 
a compensatory allowance, but it won’t be 
high because my ex also refused a promotion 
due to our situation.  
I am now looking for a new home with three 
bedrooms, close to the children’s school and 
to my work. It won’t be easy to find a place I 
can afford, and I’m told child support will be 
low due to us sharing custody, but I think I 
can make it work.  
Odile:  
Chris and I were both married before and had 
children of our own. We decided to think 
things through before making it official. 
Chris still resented the support he was paying 
his ex. I wanted to make sure that what my 
late husband left me would be my children’s 
when I died.  
After consulting a notary, we chose to sign a 
marriage contract. Separation of property. 
Chris and I agreed we both wanted to protect 
our children. We were past retirement and 
were not planning on buying a house, so I 
thought it would make no difference either 
way.  
When we got married and moved in together, 
I stopped receiving aid from the government. 
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I did not have a lot of money of my own, 
because I raised four children. Chris 
supported me.  
When we separated, I found myself poorer 
than I ever was. A legal clinic worker told me 
since I had no children with Chris I could not 
get compensatory support. They told me to 
negotiate spousal support, but Chris says he 
owes me nothing since we were married only 
for a few years.  
Irma: 
We got married when I became pregnant with 
our first child. I never thought about the legal 
stuff. It was important for us and our families 
that we got married. So, we did. We couldn’t 
afford for me to stop working. We always 
worked hard to make it to the end of the 
month. We have three beautiful children.  
For a while, our marriage was not going well. 
He says he wants to divorce. I did not know 
how it worked here in Quebec. I asked for 
help at the women’s centre. They said we 
share family patrimony but not income. We 
do not own our apartment or a car. They say 
I can apply for child and spousal support. We 
had some money saved but now he says it’s 
all his money because he earned it. I could not 
save up from what I made as a housecleaner, 
we needed to pay rent and the groceries. I 
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thought we shared what we both earned for 
the family.  
Victoria: 
When we got married, he convinced me to 
sign a marriage contract. He said it was for 
tax purposes. I wanted us to share earnings, 
but he said it was not necessary. He said I was 
the love of his life and he would always take 
care of me.  
The violence started when I was pregnant. I 
miscarried. I lost my job due to my 
depression. He asked me not to look for a new 
job. He wanted me at home. 
I have been thinking of leaving him. I went to 
a women’s centre for a few nights. He says I 
am nothing without him and I should come 
back. A volunteer helped me assess my 
options. She said because I signed that 
marriage contract, the house is all his. I might 
not have a roof over my head if I leave him. I 
don’t want to live on the streets. She says he 
does not owe me compensation because we 
don’t have children. Even though I lost my 
job after my miscarriage. I have a shot at 
spousal support though, if I can convince the 
Court. If I had not signed that stupid contract, 
we would automatically have shared the 
house. I feel betrayed.  
My friend says I should still leave him. I’m 
not sure I can make it on my own.  
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CHANGES FOR UNMARRIED COUPLES 
 
Context for Cohabitation Reforms  
 
For many in Quebec, cohabitation is equivalent to 
marriage. Almost two-thirds of children are born to 
unmarried parents.68 In 2013, seventy-one percent of 
cohabitants believed they were as good as married in terms 
of mutual obligations and inheritance rights, despite media 
coverage of the Quebec v A decision.69 Yet, cohabitants 
who have lived together for thirty years and raised three 
children are still not truly “family” in the eyes of the law. 
While Quebec law has adapted the doctrine of unjust 
enrichment to allow for compensation in extreme cases of 
unfairness, this mechanism is costly and uncertain.70 
 
Debates regarding the regulation of unmarried 
family members include how broad to cast the net, how 
deep the obligations should be, and whether the regime 
should be opt-in or opt-out.71 These questions are 
interrelated, as an opt-in regime justifies deeper 
obligations, and a wide opt-out net (for example, applying 
not only to committed unions but also to siblings living 
 
68  See The Roy Report, supra note 4 at 36. 
69  See Chambre des notaires du Québec, “Plus de 50 % des conjoints de 
fait se croient protégés alors qu'ils ne le sont pas !” (Survey 
conducted by Ipsos Descaries, Montreal, November 2007), cited in 
ibid at 275. See also Belleau, supra note 62.  
70  See The Roy Report, supra note 4 at 75. 
71  See Joanna Miles, “Unmarried Cohabitation in a European 
Perspective” in Jens M Scherpe, ed, European Family Law Vol III – 
Family Law in a European Perspective (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2016) 
82.  
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together) calls for shallower regulation.72 There is no single 
modern solution to juggle these factors, although the 
functional assimilationist approach to cohabitation has 
been gaining ground. Equality considerations first led New 
Zealand to assimilate certain cohabitants to married 
couples, with Australia slowly following suit in all but one 
state. Some Canadian provinces adopt this position, with 
Balkan states as figurehead for the assimilationist model.73 
Non-assimilationist defaults extend some but not all 
consequences of marriage to de facto couples—generally 
maintenance but not property sharing.74 Opt-in regimes 
such as the French civil solidarity pacts (PACS) provide 
some cohabitants (generally the rich and educated) a 
thinner set of obligations. In general, opt-in solutions do 
not solve the “cohabitation problem,” which includes lack 
of awareness of legal consequences, legal inaction even 
when people would prefer mutual obligations, and power 
differences between the spouse who wants and the spouse 




72  See Joanna Miles, “Should the Regime be Discretionary or Rules-
Based?” in Jessica Palmer et al, eds, Law and Policy in Modern 
Family Finance: Property Division in the 21st Century (Cambridge: 
Intersentia, 2017) 261. 
73  See Miles, supra note 72; Noel Semple, “In Sickness and in Health? 
Spousal Support and Unmarried Cohabitants” (2008) 24:2 Can J Fam 
L 317; Lindy Willmott, Benjamin P Mathews & Greg Shoebridge, 
“Defacto relationships property adjustment law - a national direction” 
(2003) 17:1 Austl J Fam L 37.  
74  See Miles, supra note 72. 
75  See Anne Barlow, “Cohabitation Law Reform—Messages From 
Research” (2006) 14:2 Fem Leg Stud 167. 
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The Proposed Reform for Unmarried Couples  
 
The Roy Report proposes a limited default regime that 
would only apply to cohabiting parents. Founded on the 
shared responsibility to contribute to the expenses of the 
family, the regime would be purely compensatory, with no 
default sharing or support obligations. The proposal would 
presume that partners who have lived together for twenty 
years without having common children are financially 
independent.  
 
The preference for a very limited default regime 
rests on the autonomy argument: the argument that the law 
should respect the choice of cohabitants to remain 
unmarried and that remaining unmarried means choosing 
to be free from mutual financial obligations. This logic fails 
to account for the impact of the parents’ “choice” on the 
child’s life.76 Indeed, opt-in regimes that perpetuate 
unmarried women’s poverty upon separation create poor 
children, yet these children had no say in their parents’ 
marital status.77  
 
The autonomy argument has also lost credibility in 
recent years as new research has exposed the reasons why 
people do not get married. Indeed, research shows that 
cohabitants have varied attitudes toward marriage. The 
cohabiting population includes: 
(i) those cohabiting short-term, perhaps early 
in life and largely for convenience, rather 
 
76  See The Roy Report, supra note 4 at 586 (Dominique Goubau’s 
dissent). 
77  See e.g. ibid. 
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than in consequence of a long-term 
commitment; (ii) those cohabiting by way of 
trial-marriage, contemplating but having not 
yet made a long-term commitment analogous 
to marriage; (iii) those cohabiting with a new 
partner following the dissolution of a 
marriage to another person, deliberat[ely] 
choosing not to make the specific 
commitment of marriage again; (iv) those 
who choose cohabitation in preference to 
marriage but who regard their relationship in 
many respects, including long-term 
commitment, as analogous to it.78 
It is one thing to deny mutual obligations to couples 
in a trial marriage (a short-term, fragile relationship) or to 
those who purposefully do not marry to avoid mutual 
obligations. It is another when people refuse to marry for 
ideological reasons (rejecting the symbolism, but not the 
legal obligations of marriage, or rejecting some but not all 
rules) or for financial reasons (for example, they cannot 
afford a wedding and are waiting for the right time to 
marry, cohabitation is not chosen but marriage is 
continually delayed).79 For some cohabitants, 
“cohabitation replaces marriage as a long-term living 
arrangement.”80 Among the many differences between 
 
78  Miles, supra note 71 at 88. 
79  See Anne Barlow & Grace James, “Regulating Marriage and 
Cohabitation in 21st Century Britain” (2004) 67:2 Mod L Rev 143 at 
158. 
80  Nicole Hiekel, Aart C Liefbroer & Anne-Rigt Poortman, 
“Understanding Diversity in the Meaning of Cohabitation Across 
Europe” (2014) 30:4 Eur J Popul 391 at 405. 
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marriage and cohabitation—religious, legal, social, 
economic—why assume that it is specifically the legal 
support and property sharing aspects that cohabitants are 
rejecting? As Barlow puts it, “[c]ertainly there is no 
evidence that the majority of cohabitants are seeking to 
avoid the legal implications of marriage. Rather the 
majority believe they are already subject to them.”81  
 
What about couples in which one person wants to 
marry and the other does not? This was the case in Quebec 
v A, yet the Supreme Court used the rhetoric of choice and 
autonomy to justify the discriminatory treatment of the 
claimant.82 As Masha Antokolskaia explains, “sometimes 
the economically stronger partner deliberately frustrates 
the institutionali[z]ation of cohabitation or the registration 
of marriage in order to deprive the weaker party of legal 
protection.”83 Thus, poverty and lack of power (including 
power imbalance due to intimate partner violence) strip 
from categories of women the supposed “autonomy” of 
choosing one’s conjugal status. This means that it is 
dangerous to generalize about what cohabitants choose to 
justify rules which have damaging social and distributive 
consequences. Such an approach also contradicts my 
proposed centring method by treating women with 
 
81  Barlow, supra note 75 at 173. See also Belleau, supra note 62. 
82  See Quebec (Attorney General) v A, supra note 6 at paras 435, 438, 
442. 
83  M V Antokolskaia, “Economic Consequences of Informal 
Heterosexual Cohabitation From A Comparative Perspective: Respect 
Parties’ Autonomy or Protection of the Weaker Party?” in Alain-
Laurent Verbeke et al, eds, Confronting the Frontiers of Family and 
Succession Law: Liber Amicorum Walter Pintens (Cambridge: 
Intersentia, 2012) 41 at 48. 
460     CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 32, 2019] 
 
diminished power in their relationship (be it due to poverty 
or intimate partner violence) as exceptions rather than 
central cases.  
 
If the choice argument fails, a minimalistic regime 
cannot be presumed to be any more autonomy-enhancing 
than a denser regime. Realism and pragmatism are also 
absent from the reform. The proposed opt-in regime 
“assume[s] a degree of self-interest, legal knowledge and 
common sense that is in fact lacking at the crucial time.”84 
In the real world, “most people do not make relationship 
choices based on the rational criteria assumed by 
legislators and policy makers, but rather according to a 
rationality prevailing in their own lives.”85 Couples’ 
confusion would be exacerbated by increased complexity 
in the law: replacing two statuses (married or unmarried) 
with four (married with a child, married without a child, 
unmarried with a child, or unmarried without a child). 
 
In deciding to let cohabitants fend for themselves in 
defining their union, the Government of Quebec and the 
Roy Committee want to avoid imposing unwanted 
obligations on modern relations. However, considering the 
impacts of inequality, optimism bias,86 misinformation,87 
irrationality, and the costs of contracting,88 this approach 
 
84  Gillian Douglas, Julia Pearce & Hilary Woodward, “Cohabitants, 
Property and the Law: A Study of Injustice” (2009) 72:1 Mod L Rev 
24 at 36. See also Belleau, supra note 22. 
85  Barlow, supra note 75 at 174.  
86  See Reece, supra note 64 at 121–22. 
87  See ibid at 116. 
88  See ibid at 119–21. 
     ALL FAMILIES ARE EQUAL, BUT DO SOME MATTER    461
MORE THAN OTHERS? 
sacrifices the one-size-fits-most approach for the one-size-
fits-none.  
 
Voices of Four Unmarried Women 
 
Denise 
When we started dating, neither of us was 
ready to get married. Things became more 
serious and I moved in with him. We decided 
to wait before planning a wedding. We kept 
our finances partially separate, and I rented 
rather than sold my apartment in case things 
did not work out.  
After two years, we decided to separate—it 
was better that way. Thankfully, we had no 
children. I just packed my things and left. I’m 
happy I don’t have to go through a long and 
painful divorce, although I wonder if one of 
the reasons that we broke up is that we never 
fully committed. I am back in my old place 
and trying to move forward with my life.  
Odile 
When I met Chris, I was not in a rush to get 
remarried. He said he didn’t want to for legal 
reasons. I thought it made sense and that it 
might be a good way to honour my late 
husband. I asked my notary if my relationship 
with Chris would affect my will, and he said 
no. I wanted to make sure my children were 
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protected, even though they are now grown 
up.  
We moved to a fancy neighbourhood, and I 
had to use my savings to pay my part of the 
rent. The idea of getting married resurfaced, 
but he did not seem to want that, and I did not 
push it. He never proposed despite my hints. 
He said that when we moved to our new 
condo, we would own it together. That way, 
I would be protected. When we did, I 
assumed he remembered the plan. He was 
stressed, and I did not want to complicate 
matters. He always got so sensitive when he 
thought I was protecting myself in case I 
wanted to leave him.  
He kept his finances separate, but he 
provided for me. He passed suddenly six 
years into our relationship. That’s when I 
learned the condo was only in his name. He 
had no will, so everything went to his 
children, and I had to leave our home. I am 
now living with my daughter, who is not 
thrilled but doesn’t say anything. She helps 
pay my medical bills. Funny how you always 
think these things only happen to others.  
Irma 
We wanted to get married when I got 
pregnant with our first child. Money was 
tight—we decided to wait until we could 
afford a small wedding. Life got in the way, 
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and we never married. We had three children. 
We worked double shifts to provide for them.  
He said last week he wants to separate. He 
said I should leave the apartment. I asked for 
help at a women’s centre. They said I will not 
get spousal support because we are not 
married, and I will not get compensation 
because I did not stop working for the 
children. They helped me calculate the child 
support I can get. I do not know how I will be 
able to afford a roof over my head and my 
children’s. I am trying to convince Damien 
not to leave me.  
Victoria 
My partner and I had been living together for 
almost a year when I started speaking of 
marriage. I thought it would be more 
romantic, but for him, it was out of the 
question. I was never able to convince him.  
When he became violent, I started to fear that 
he did not love me like I loved him. After I 
miscarried, my friends told me I should leave 
him, but he promised to change. He seemed 
to deeply regret what had happened.  
After my depression, I did not return to work. 
I became worried about what would happen 
to me if he left. I was anxious to address the 
question directly, and one day, I got the 
courage to ask that we get married or sign a 
cohabitation contract. I was pregnant again, 
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and I thought it was a good moment to fortify 
our relationship. He got so mad. He said: 
“Why are you talking about a contract? Are 
you about to leave me? Are you cheating on 
me?” He said, if I left him, he would kill 
himself, and it would be my fault. I did not 
bring up the topic again. 
Since my second miscarriage, he has become 
very controlling with what I do, what I can 
buy. I have no money—I cannot find a job, 
and I no longer qualify for assistance because 
he earns a lot. What I had saved is now long 
gone. He owns the house and the car, and he 
has invested for his retirement. Even if I 
could leave him, where would I go?  
I feel trapped.  
THE RESULTS: WHERE WE IDENTIFY THREE 
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS WITH THE 
AUTONOMY-CENTRIC REFORM 
  
The reform promises difficulties for people affected by 
poverty, domestic violence, and the very much related 
inability to engage in paid work. It fails to centre the needs 
of vulnerable women and instead creates more 
vulnerability due to three fundamental errors, which I will 
discuss in the following sections.   
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PROBLEM 1: A QUESTIONABLE CONCEPTION 
OF AUTONOMY  
 
The reform’s recognition of “diversity”89 actually favours 
a golden model of independence. The cost of autonomy is 
not evenly distributed among legal subjects. While Denise 
(educated and financially independent) and Odile (having 
experienced a first marriage) can make more 
autonomous—albeit unfavourable—legal choices, Irma 
(lacking financial resources) and Victoria (being in a 
controlling relationship) are penalized by increased 
autonomy. The reform project takes freedom of contract as 
proxy for autonomy and as the perfect solution to family 
law problems. Yet, history teaches us that 
contractualization can betray married women90 and is of 
little assistance in solving the cohabitation problem.91 In 
fact, the whole point of family law is that regular contract 
and property law are ill-adapted to the family context.92 
 
 
89  See Ministère de la Justice, “Family Law Reform”, supra note 2 at 3, 
7. 
90  See Grassby, supra note 53. 
91  See Louise Langevin, “Liberté de choix et protection juridique des 
conjoints de fait en cas de rupture: difficile exercice de jonglerie” 
(2009) 54:4 McGill LJ 697; Louise Langevin, “Liberté contractuelle 
et relations conjugales: font-elles bon ménage?” (2009) 28:2 
Nouvelles questions féministes 24. 
92  See e.g. American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations (St Paul, MN: American 
Law Institute, 2002) at 1063ff (comment c on § 7.02, “Special 
circumstances applicable to agreements about family dissolution”); 
Scherpe, supra note 65.  
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Relational autonomy theorists contest the 
association of autonomy with independence and self-
sufficiency.93 Giving effect to interdependent relationships 
and promoting equality within relationships is more 
autonomy-enhancing than mere freedom to contract. Is 
Victoria really more autonomous when she has the choice 
to opt out of protections than when she has the choice to 
leave a violent relationship? The Roy Committee itself 
recognizes that more freedom does not always lead to 
autonomy, since it argues for keeping and even 
strengthening the impossibility for Quebec women to take 
their husband’s name.94 Unfortunately, this insight does 
not carry to proposals regarding the financial consequences 
of unions.  
 
However, it is true that some people can and want 
to make autonomous legal decisions. The problem is that 
the people most likely to be autonomous in their choice of 
regime are also the ones who model for the default. A more 
protective default regime would be better adapted to 
Victoria’s unequal relationship without infringing on 
Denise’s and on independent couples’ capacity to choose 
their own regime—a form of asymmetric paternalism.95 As 
Justice Abella argues in Quebec v A:  
 
93  See e.g. Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, Relational autonomy: 
Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 4. 
94  See The Roy Report, supra note 4 at 130. 
95  See Colin Camerer et al, “Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral 
Economics and the Case for ‘Asymmetric Paternalism’” (2003) 151:3 
U Pa L Rev 1211 at 1212. 
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opt in protections may well be adequate for 
some de facto spouses who enter their 
relationships with sufficient financial 
security, legal information, and the deliberate 
intent to avoid the consequences of a more 
formal union. But their ability to exercise 
freedom of choice can be equally protected 
under a protective regime with an 
opt out mechanism. The needs of the 
economically vulnerable, however, require 
presumptive protection no less in de 
facto unions than in more formal ones.96 
In terms of autonomy, we have little to gain and 
much to lose in restricting protective default regimes.  
 
Moreover, default entitlements affect outcomes of 
negotiations.97 A default protective regime can attenuate 
unequal power distributions (due to economic disparities 
and controlling behaviour) by giving the weaker partner 
bargaining chips to arrive at a fairer solution, even if the 
protections allow for opting out. For example, if Victoria 
has property entitlements, she can use them to negotiate 
spousal support (or custody if she had a child). When she 
has nothing to bargain with, her ability to negotiate opting 
into property sharing is minimal and certainly not 
comparable to Denise’s ability to opt out of it.  
 
 
96  Quebec (Attorney General) v A, supra note 4 at para 372 (Justice 
Abella). 
97  See Robert H Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, “Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce” (1979) 88:5 Yale LJ 950 
at 968. 
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The reform would not allow everyone to tailor their 
own regime to their needs. Behind a façade of choice for 
all hides a normative preference for independent conjugal 
life that, in a society still marked by profound gender (and 
race, and class, and ability) inequalities, is wishful 
thinking.  
 
In conclusion, we do not make wins on the 
autonomy front by approaching family law with 
minimalistic obligations and freedom of contract. Nor do 
we appropriately respond to the diversity of families that 
includes situations of poverty and violence. The reform 
proposal fails on its own evaluative standards. 
 
PROBLEM 2: THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE 
INTERACTION 
 
Régine Tremblay observes that “[w]hile being technically 
outlaws to civil law, de facto unions nonetheless produce 
various effects in Quebec.”98 The all-important choice of 
financial independence by unmarried partners is for 
instance disregarded by the Taxation Act, the Individual 
and Family Assistance Act, and other social laws.99  
 
Consider Victoria’s situation in the cohabiting 
scenario. Victoria can lose welfare benefits or even spousal 
support from a former husband on the 
 
98  Régine Tremblay, “Sans Foi, Ni Loi. Appearances of Conjugality and 
Lawless Love” in Anne-Sophie Hulin, Robert Leckey & Lionel 
Smith, eds, Les apparences en droit civil (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 
2015) 155 at 161. 
99  Taxation Act, RLRQ c I-3, art 2.2.1; Loi sur l'aide aux personnes et 
aux familles, RLRQ c A-13.1.1, art 22. 
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irrebuttable presumption that her partner shares his 
resources. However, family law does not command such 
sharing. Erez Aloni labels the public law recognition of 
Victoria’s union as “deprivative recognition”.100 People 
who “belong to particularly vulnerable populations, such 
as those who qualify for means-tested programs”101 and 
couples (including lesbian couples) “where both partners 
are at a low income level”102 are likely to experience partial 
recognition as producing disadvantages overall.103 Quebec 
family law thus maintains a double-standards system that 
penalizes low-income people without consideration for 
their conjugal choices.  
 
In Victoria’s case, the interaction between public 
and private law creates forced dependence—not individual 
autonomy. At the intersection of poverty and violence, 
women are made vulnerable to economic violence, 
especially if they cannot work due to disability, precarious 
status, or conjugal violence. Hence, “the legislature’s 
inclusion of de facto spouses in social and fiscal laws 
during their union exacerbate[s] their exclusion from the 
private law’s obligation of support.”104  
 
 
100  Erez Aloni, “Deprivative Recognition” (2013) 61:5 UCLA L Rev 
1276 at 1281–82. 
101  Ibid at 1276. 
102  Boyd, supra note 42 at 378. 
103  See Claire FL Young, “Taxing Times for Lesbians and Gay Men: 
Equality at What Cost” (1994) 17 Dal LJ 534 at 535. 
104  Robert Leckey, “Strange bedfellows” (2014) 64:5 UTLJ 641 at 655; 
See also Langevin, “Liberté de choix”, supra note 91 at 714. 
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Upon separation, shallow family obligations not 
only exacerbate economic disparities between women and 
men, but also tie up state resources, as seen in Odile’s case. 
Nordic countries are a case on point to understand the 
interaction of public and private responses to poverty. In 
Nordic countries, “covering post-marital ‘need’ is not 
necessarily the responsibility of the former spouse.”105 
Rather, “any citizen in need (even as the result of a 
relationship breakdown), is entitled to state support.”106 In 
Sweden, for example, maintenance after divorce is limited, 
and obligations between separating cohabitants are 
minimal. This contrasts with the Balkan states where even 
for cohabitants, support obligations are mandatory.107  
 
The reform would introduce Nordic-like family law 
without Nordic-like welfare. Poverty has important 
societal, economic, and public health consequences. Poor 
women (and their children) must be assisted, be it through 
socialization or privatization.  
 
The former may be preferable to the latter, 
especially when considering the limits of privatized 
remedies for black women.108 Boyd also writes that 
assigning responsibility for women’s poverty to individual 
 
105  Jens M Scherpe, “Contracting Out of the Default Relationship 
Property Regime – Comparative Observations” in Jessica Palmer et 
al, eds, Law and policy in modern family finance: property division in 
the 21st century (Cambridge, UK: Intersentia, 2017) at 367. 
106  Ibid at 392. 
107  See Miles, supra note 71 at 108. 
108  See Andrea H Beller & John W Graham, Small Change: The 
Economics of Child Support (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1996); Boyd, supra note 29 at 178. 
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men with whom they have recognized relationships means 
that “responsibility for the costs of social reproduction and 
for economic hardship remains privatized, and the 
gendered relations of dependency are thereby 
reinforced.”109 A possible counter-argument is that dense 
family responsibilities could incentivize men to support 
rather than hinder their partner’s career and quest for 
financial security. In any case, until a reform of social laws 
is on the table, rejecting the private solution results in 
continued precarity—a position from which 
underprivileged women cannot enjoy their high-priced 
autonomy. 
 
PROBLEM 3: A REDUCTIVE VIEW OF 
INEQUALITY  
 
The reform advances a reductive view of inequality, 
recognizing only relationship-generated and children-
related disadvantages. This project may suit the needs of 
Denise, who is financially independent until she bears 
children (although she will still end up undercompensated). 
Our other characters show different vulnerabilities.  
 
Odile enters her relationship having already 
suffered relationship- and gender-related disadvantages. 
She “has suffered the economic differential within the 
labour market of being both a woman, once-a-wife and a 
mother,”110 while her partner has benefitted from the 
financial benefits of being a man and husband. Irma’s 
 
109  Boyd, supra note 29 at 177.  
110  Anne Bottomley, “From Mrs. Burns to Mrs. Oxley: Do Co-Habiting 
Women (still) Need Marriage Law?” (2006) 14:2 Fem Leg Stud 181 
at 191.  
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salary is affected by gender and racial discrimination, 
making her unable to afford maternity leave. The effects of 
child-bearing on her earning capacity are subtler than for 
Denise. The compensation model fails these characters, 
and would also fail “the wife who did not acquire 
marketable skills before marriage, precisely because she 
intended to be home with children and to make that 
substantial marital investment.”111 Women’s poverty is 
multifaceted, and only granting relevance to the direct 
consequences of child-rearing is reductive.  
 
Gender bias also surfaces in opt-in regimes that 
demand actions—insisting on a contract, negotiating in 
one’s self-interest—that are at odds with expected 
feminine behaviour. As Anne Bottomley explains, “women 
and men deploy language, conversations and silences 
differently—and that this leaves women crucially 
disadvantaged in an area of law which requires express 
discussions on express issues.”112 Emotional vulnerability 
adds to economic vulnerability. Like Odile, “[w]omen will 
too often hope for the best”113 and become vulnerable to a 
man’s controlling behaviour,114 while he secures his 
economic investments and decides whether the union 
should be formalized.  
 
 
111  DA Rollie Thompson, “Ideas of Spousal Support Entitlement” (2014) 
34:1 Can Fam LQ 1 at 12, citing Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in Moge v 
Moge, [1992] 3 SCR 813. 
112  Bottomley, supra note 110 at 196. 
113  Ibid. 
114  See ibid at 197 (discussing the situation of Mrs. Oxley from Oxley v 
Hiscock, [2004] EWCA Civ 546). 
     ALL FAMILIES ARE EQUAL, BUT DO SOME MATTER    473
MORE THAN OTHERS? 
Lastly, the reform proposal ignores domestic 
violence as relationship-generated inequality. Violence 
makes it doubtful that any decision of the couple reflects 
the victim’s autonomy. Women’s vulnerability is worsened 
by both the reduction of mandatory protections and the 
opting-in logic. The law can nullify contracts signed under 
coercive circumstances,115 but how can it protect Victoria 
against not signing a cohabiting contract due to her 
partner’s violence? Further, the regime ignores the effects 
that domestic violence can have on earning capacity, 
irrespective of child-rearing.116 
 
THE BETTER WAY: WHERE WE SEPARATE THE 
JUSTIFICATION MECHANISM OF 
COMPENSATION 
 
How can these problems be remedied? The best option 
would be to abandon a vision of marriage based on 
individual responsibility and compensation. The proposed 
compensatory mechanism would perpetuate gender 
inequalities, create perverse incentives, substitute fairness 
for proportionality, rarely be applicable despite its 
supposedly mandatory character, and create a 
disadvantageous anchoring effect that would curtail 
awards.117 
 
115  See Miglin v Miglin, 2003 SCC 24 at para 81. 
116  See The Roy Report, supra note 4 at 588 (Dominique Goubau’s 
dissent); Kathryn Showalter, “Women’s employment and domestic 
violence: A review of the literature” (2016) 31 Aggression & Violent 
Behavior 37. 
117  See Suzanne Zaccour, “Pour un droit de la famille réaliste, équitable 
et accessible”, Brief presented to the Quebec Minister of Justice in 
 
474     CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 32, 2019] 
 
In case the Roy Report’s compensation logic gains 
traction, it is important to understand that a compensation 
logic can still lead to different results if we untangle 
justification, entitlement, and remedy.  
 
SOLUTION 1: FIXING ENTITLEMENT 
CONDITIONS 
 
Even on a compensation rationale, the Committee’s 
eligibility rules are underinclusive. Compensation can be 
called for when spouses do not have common children. 
Here are a few examples of women who would be denied 
access to the new compensatory regime: 
 
• Lucie has lived with Marc for ten years. She has 
experienced two miscarriages leading to depression 
and loss of employment. 
• Clara has lived with Lucas for eight years. She has 
experienced constant conjugal violence affecting her 
ability to engage in paid work.  
• Camilla quit her job and moved to a new city so that 
her partner John could accept a promotion. Finding a 
new job took her six months, and her salary dropped by 
twenty-five percent.  
• Stephanie has lived with Eric for thirty years. Since 
they moved in together, she has not engaged in paid 
work. She took care of first Eric’s children from a 
 
the context of public consultations on family law reform (28 June 
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previous marriage, then his demanding career, and 
finally his aging parents.   
 
A compensation logic does not take us to a single 
obvious set of rules. Because having a child is not the only 
cause of financial interdependence, many jurisdictions 
extend eligibility to cohabitation remedies to partners who 
have been in a stable relationship, meaning “passing as 
married”118 in terms of the nature or specific duration of 
the relationship.119 Manitoba defines three routes to 
remedies for unmarried spouses: registration, having lived 
together for a year and having a child, or having lived 
together for at least three years.120 There are other possible 
definitions, such as having a child121 or having suffered a 
relationship-generated disadvantage122 (which should 
include intimate partner violence). Interestingly, Scotland 
imposes no minimum duration or child requirement, but 
uses self-limiting remedies that depend on the economic 
disadvantage linked to the relationship.123 What the 
Quebec reform proposes to do through eligibility, Scotland 
does at the quantum stage. Since the proposed remedy 
 
118  Rebecca Probert, The Changing Legal Regulation of Cohabitation: 
From Fornicators to Family, 1600-2010 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012) at 52. 
119  See Antokolskaia, supra note 83 at 60. 
120  See Family Maintenance Act, CCSM c F20, s 1. 
121  Wong argues that there should be no cohabitant requirement for 
unmarried parents to access remedies. See Simone Wong, 
“Cohabitation and the Law Commission’s Project” (2006) 14:2 Fem 
Leg Stud 145 at 150. 
122  See Antokolskaia, supra note 83 at 61. 
123  See Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 (Scot), ASP 2, s 25. 
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requires evaluating the partners’ disproportionate 
contributions, the bright-line rule suggested by the Roy 
Committee is not necessary to dissuade unmeritorious 
claims.124 In other words, if a childless woman has suffered 
no disadvantage, she will be unable to satisfy the other 
conditions for claiming a compensatory allowance.  
 
Eligibility responds to two categories of concerns. 
The practical concern calls for clarity and avoidance of 
messy disputes. The normative concern is to identify 
relationships deserving of marriage-like or other remedies. 
The reform proposal provides clear-cut rules but fails the 
normative test. A possible compromise would be to define 
a high length threshold (for example, five or ten years) or 
to allow cohabitants without children to qualify for 
remedies if they disprove a presumption of financial 
independence or lack of relationship-generated 
disadvantage. But since the remedy will depend on proving 
disproportionate contributions, there is little use in pre-
identifying with categorical rules the kinds of relationships 
where disproportionate contributions may happen.  
 
SOLUTION 2: FIXING THE REMEDY FOR 
DISPROPORTIONATE CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
A compensation rationale does not, as the Roy Committee 
asserts,125 preclude a remedy of property sharing or 
periodical payments. Consider the spousal support 
 
124  See also Robert Leckey, “Cohabitation, Law Reform, and the 
Litigants” (2017) 31:2 Intl JL Pol’y & Fam 131 at 136 on the 
floodgates argument. 
125  See Ministère de la Justice, “Family Law Reform”, supra note 2 at 
10. 
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advisory guidelines, developed by Carol Rogerson and 
Rollie Thompson and widely used by courts and litigants. 
These guidelines have compensation as one of their main 
rationales. Thompson explains that “[o]ne of the 
fundamental problems of compensatory theory is the 
complexity of the evidence required.”126 The guidelines 
use other measures as proxies for gain and loss in the name 
of efficiency and access to justice. Thompson emphasizes 
that the guidelines “use ‘income sharing’ as a method of 
constructing formulas, but not as an adoption of a general 
philosophy of income sharing after separation.”127 As he 
further explains, “[i]t is important to distinguish the use of 
proxies . . . from the theory that underpins entitlement. The 
fit does not have to be perfect, as long as it produces 
tolerable results.”128 
 
Like Rogerson and Thompson, the Roy Committee 
recognizes the need for practical solutions and workable 
guidelines. We do not yet know what compensatory 
guidelines could look like, how monetary and non-
monetary contributions would be compared, and how the 
different factors would come into play (including efforts to 
minimize loss, ability to pay, and the advantages of the 
matrimonial regime). However, we cannot cast aside the 
risk that guidelines focused on proportionality (rather than 
gain) would produce low awards. Compensatory regimes 
pose evidential problems and penalize women whose 
contributions tend to be less tangible (time rather than 
money, emotional labor, etcetera) and less visible 
 
126  Thompson, supra note 111 at 27. 
127  Ibid at 23. 
128  Ibid at 28–29. 
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(groceries rather than a down payment). Note that existing 
compensatory mechanisms—the compensatory allowance 
for married couples and unjust enrichment for unmarried 
couples—are rarely used, hence the reform. As Laurence 
Saint-Pierre Harvey observes, “the disproportionate 
importance that evidence takes in cases of compensatory 
allowance seems to stand in tension, and even to be 
irreconcilable, with the idea of an accessible family 
justice.”129 Family litigants can rarely afford to produce 
adequate evidence of loss and gain, especially for careers 
that do not have clear salary scales.130 Evidential 
difficulties are exacerbated for poor, self-represented 
litigants. This is why need-based analyses have often been 
privileged by courts since Moge, despite its compensatory 
rationale.131  
 
Adopting another mechanism to fulfill the 
compensation goal could attenuate these quantification and 
evidential problems. Compensation can be achieved 
though periodical awards or property sharing. For example, 
English courts tend to apply the three fundamental 
principles of needs, sharing, and compensation through 
property allocation132 rather than separating as Quebec 
does the pillars of property, maintenance, and 
compensation.  
 
129  Laurence Saint-Pierre Harvey, “Prestation compensatoire et union de 
fait en droit québécois: Étude critique du discours judiciaire” (2018) 
31:2 Can J Fam L 127 at 162 [author translation]. 
130  See Thompson, supra note 111 at 10. 
131  See Carol J Rogerson, “Spousal Support After Moge” (1996) 14 Can 
Fam LQ 281 at 285. 
132  See Scherpe, supra note 105; Miller v Miller; McFarlane v 
McFarlane, [2006] UKHL 24. 
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Opting for property division or periodical payments 
as the remedy once litigants have passed the entitlement 
hurdle would benefit access to justice.133 Discretionary and 
evidentially burdensome solutions penalize the weaker or 
marginalized party who is “likely to encounter barriers in 
her invocation of assistance from the judiciary.”134 Further, 
in compensatory support orders, “judges consistently 
ignore or underestimate the compensatory disadvantage 
going forward.”135 The logic of clean break embedded in 
the one-time compensatory allowance limits the 
compensation of the mother whose disproportionate 
contribution happens post-separation. Indeed, the reform 
would limit compensation after separation, requiring 
special circumstances such as neglect by the non-custodial 
parent or disability of the child.136 If parents bear equal 
responsibility for common children, why does the 
requirement of proportional contribution weaken after 
separation?  
 
A clean break logic is also limited by the payor’s 
means at or around the time of separation, even though 
disproportionate contributions may continue to affect the 
mother (negatively) and the father (positively) for decades 
to come. Poor women would receive even less money than 
they are entitled to because their partner does not have the 
money now. The one-time payment also requires 
 
133  This is acknolwedged by the Roy Committee. See The Roy Report, 
supra note 4 at 76. 
134  Boyd, supra note 32 at 51.  
135  Thompson, supra note 111 at 30. 
136  See Ministère de la Justice, “Family Law Reform”, note 2 at 13. 
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hypothesizing about the future, while periodical payments 
can be reviewed if the parties’ conditions change.  
 
While noble, a clean-break objective is rarely 
realistic.137 In a time when shared custody has become 
normative, it is ironic that mothers’ autonomy can be 
curtailed over the long run by custody orders,138 while their 
resources are slashed by a clean-break logic. In any case, it 
would be possible to have periodical payments as a default, 
while allowing for the payment of a one-time sum when it 
is adequate. 
 
For a fair reform that truly compensates 
disproportionate contributions, we would need either 
refined eligibility criteria or a better choice of remedy. 
Extending the entitlement to spousal support or equal 
sharing of family patrimony to all couples who have 
children or who can prove a relationship-generated 
disadvantage would be one avenue to correct 
underinclusiveness and to truly start recognizing the 
diversity of families.  
 
CONCLUSION: STILL WAITING FOR EQUALITY 
 
Family law reforms are few and far between. Seemingly 
lacking political appeal, this area of law affects almost 
everyone, yet appears neglected in political campaigns, 
societal debates, and feminist activism. Quebec’s reform 
 
137  See Bracklow v Bracklow, [1999] 1 SCR 420 at para 27, 169 DLR 
(4th) 577 (noting that many marriages fit neither of the mutual-
obligation or clean-break models). 
138  See Susan B Boyd, “Autonomy for Mothers? Relational Theory and 
Parenting Apart” (2010) 18:2 Fem Leg Stud 137 at 138. 
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project is, then, an important event. Unfortunately, what is 
proposed to women is a mixed bag, with small 
improvements being accompanied by high costs. 
Domestic-violence victims are not protected from opting 
out of sharing family patrimony, and the economic 
consequences of violence are not considered in the 
compensatory mechanisms. Underprivileged couples are 
also penalized by the change in default matrimonial regime 
and the perpetuation of an opt-in logic for de facto spouses.  
 
If family law can be caricatured as “a Manichaean 
struggle between atomistic liberalism and a socially 
contextualized feminism,”139 the reform project 
indubitably falls into the former camp. Quebec families 
deserve the protection of family patrimony, partnership of 
acquests, and default regulation of de facto unions. Yet, the 
Roy Committee’s project chooses formal over substantial 
equality, idealism over reality, and men over women. Let 
it be buried six feet under until “all families are equal” can 
be said without irony. 
 
139  Robert Leckey, “Contracting Claims and Family Law Feuds” (2007) 
57:1 UTLJ 1 at 1. 
